UIC Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 7

Spring 1972

Blonder-Tongue: Collateral Estoppel in Patent Infringement Cases,
5 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 356 (1972)
Canella E. Henrichs

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Canella E. Henrichs, Blonder-Tongue: Collateral Estoppel in Patent Infringement Cases, 5 J. Marshall J. of
Prac. & Proc. 356 (1972)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/7
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

BLONDER-TONGUE: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
INTRODUCTION

In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the rule established in Triplett v. Lowell, 2 that in patent
infringement cases, a judgment of invalidity against any or
all claims of a patent will not operate as an estoppel in another
action involving the same patent but different defendants.
By specifically reversing Triplett, is the Supreme Court now
saying that a finding of patent invalidity will operate in effect
as in rem adjudication of the patent - or is its decision less
encompassing?
The first infringement suit involving the patent in BlonderTongue was filed on March 8, 1966, in the Southern District of
Iowa against Winegard Company, a manufacturer of another
accused product. Prior to a determination in the Iowa suit, an
infringement suit was filed on March 29, 1966, against a customer
of Blonder-Tongue in the Northern District of Illinois. BlonderTongue submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Court
for the purpose of defending its customer. In June, 1967, following the filing of the Illinois suit, Judge Stephenson in the Southern District of Iowa entered judgment against plaintiff, University of Illinois Foundation, assignee of the patent, finding the
patent invalid on the ground that "[I] t would have been obvious
to one ordinarily skilled in the art . . . to combine these three

old elements, all suggested by the prior art references previously
discussed."'
The decision of the District Court in the Southern District
of Iowa was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit on September 30, 1968.1 On June 27, 1968,
1 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Blonder-Tongue].
2 Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as Triplett]:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudication adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit
upon the same claims against a different defendant. While the earlier
decision may by comity be given great weight in a later litigation and
thus persuade the court to render a like decree, it is not res adjudicata

and may not be pleaded as a defense.
Id. at 642.
8 The discussion in this article will be limited to the plea of collateral

estoppel.
4 University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Company, 271 F. Supp.
412, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
5 University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Company, 402 F.2d

125 (8th Cir. 1968).
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prior to the affirmance by the Eighth Circuit, Judge Hoffman in
the Northern District of Illinois rendered judgment against
defendant, Blonder-Tongue, finding the same patent valid and
infringed.6 Judge Hoffman, noting that the patent had once
been held invalid, stated that:
This court is, of course, free to decide the case at bar on the basis
of the evidence before it ....
Although a patent has been adjudged
invalid in another patent infringement action against other defendants, patent owners cannot be deprived 'of the right to show,
if they can, that, as against defendants who have not previously
been in court, the patent is valid and infringed.' . . . On the basis
of the evidence before it, this court disagrees with the conclusion
reached 7in the Winegard case and finds . . . valid and enforceable
patents.
In February, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed Judge Hoffman's decision as to this particular
patent." It was from this final determination by the Seventh
Circuit that Blonder-Tongue petitioned for certiorari based on
the conflict in decisions between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. On this basis certiorari was granted.9
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court, of its own initiative, considered reversal of the doctrine established in Triplett. The parties in
no way contended that the doctrine established should now be
reversed. 10
The Supreme Court first evaluated a trend in cases
(other than patent) to extend a plea of estoppel beyond the
scope of the initial mutuality rule,11 noting numerable exceptions to the rule and finally the complete rejection of the doctrine
of mutuality in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association." It then evaluated a trend in decisions to
reject the mutuality requirement since Bernhard in both State
and Federal Courts."
The Court then extended the trend by
rejecting the mutuality requirement in patent litigation 14 on a
three point basis: considerations relevant to the patent system,
6 Blonder-Tongue, supra note 1, at 316.

The case in the Northern District of Illinois involved two patents.
concern
here is only with the patent which was also litigated in Iowa.
7

Our

d.

8 University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,

Inc., 422 F.2d 769, (7th Cir. 1970).
9 Blonder-Tongue, supra note 1, at 317, petition for cert. granted, 400
U.S. 864 (1970).
10 Blonder-Tongue, supra note 1, at 319.
11 Id. at 321.
12 Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal.
2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
13 Blonder-Tongue, supra note 1, at 322-27.
14 rd. at 350.
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economic costs, and court expediency. 15
Also, the Court significantly limited the application of the
estoppel plea in patent cases to those situations wherein the

initial determination, involving the validity and scope of the
patent, was final and the plaintiff was the patent owner."

This

limitation, apparently eliminated from consideration those situations where the first case was a Declaratory Judgment action
filed by an alleged infringer against the defendant/patent-owner
who was then required to try the issue of patent infringement as
a counterclaim.
Further, the Blonder Court limited the application of the
estoppel plea to only those situations where plain tiff/patentowner has had "a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively
and evidentially to pursue his claim the first time."1 7 Addition-

ally commenting upon this element, the Court stated:
This element in the estoppel decision will comprehend, we believe,
the important concerns about the complexity of patent litigation
and the posited hazard that the prior proceedings were seriously
18
defective.
In considering application of this element, the Court elaborated
on the following specific situations:
Determining whether a patentee has had a full and fair chance to
litigate the validity of his patent in an earlier case is of necessity
not a simple matter. In addition to the considerations of choice
of forum and incentive to litigate mentioned above, certain other
factors immediately emerge. For example, if the issue is nonobviousness, appropriate inquiries would be whether the first
validity determination purported to employ the standards announced in Graham v. John Deere Co., supra; whether the opinions
filed by the District Court and the reviewing court, if any, indicate
that the prior case was one of those relatively rare instances where
the courts wholly failed to grasp the technical subject matter and
issues in suit; and whether without fault of his own the patentee
was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first litigation.
* , * In the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial court's
sense of justice and equity."'
At first glance, it would seem that instead of reducing the
expense and lessening the burden on court dockets in patent
litigation, which were motivating factors in reversing Triplett,
the Supreme Court has instead opened a Pandora's box. Now it
appears that whenever an estoppel plea is raised the court will
necessarily have to consider whether the court in which the first
case was tried was one in which:
15 Id. at 330.
16 Id. at 332.
17 Id. at 333.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 333-34.

,
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1. The decision was final.
2. The plaintiff was the patentee or patent owner, thereby
initiating the litigation and having the choice of forums.
3. The applicable substantive rules of law were applied and
were applied properly
4. The court in fact understood the technical subject matter
and issues in suit.
5. The plaintiff was not deprived of any crucial evidence or
witnesses; or, if deprived, it was through the plaintiff's
own fault.
6. The interests of justice and equity were properly served
in the first case.
If the patent owner is able to attack a prior determination
of invalidity under any one of the above tests, the court should be
bound to relitigate the issue of patent validity.20
A NEW DOCTRINE OF COMITY

In retrospect, Blonder-Tongue might be looked upon as a
new doctrine of comity.
As espoused in Triplett, courts would usually reconsider the
issue of patent validity where the patent had previously been
declared invalid. 21 A different rule, however, was applied where
the patent had been held valid in prior adjudications. Usually,
courts would either not reconsider the issue of validity 22 or would
20 On remand Judge Hoffman determined that the patentee in the first
case had a "full and fair chance" to litigate the validity issue; that the
Iowa court had properly considered the substantive element; that it had a
grasp of the technical subject matter and issues in suit; and that there was
no just or equitable cause to entitle the patentee to relitigate. Additionally,
Judge Hoffman found that although plaintiff in the first (Iowa) case did not
allege infringement of claims 6 through 8 of the patent in suit, the validity
of the entire patent was placed in issue by the defendant and that the determination of the Iowa court adjudged the entire patent null and void. The
University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.,
334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
Plaintiff has appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, Appeal Docket No. 71-1879 (7th Cir. 1971).
21 For a discussion of conditions as they existed prior to Blonder-Tongue
see E. Schopler, Modern Status of Federal Rules of Res Judicata in Patent
Litigation, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 181 (1970); and M. Lieberman and G. Nelson,
In Remi Validity - A Two-Sided Coin, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 9 (1971).
22 Searles v. Worden, 11 F. 501, 502 (D. Mich. 1882):
In patent causes . . . where the same issue has been passed upon by the
circuit court sitting in another district, it is only in case of a clear
mistake of law or fact, of newly discovered testimony, or upon some
question not considered by such court, that we feel at liberty to review
its findings.
Accord, Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Elliott Button Fastener
Co., 58 F. 220, 223 (W.D. Mich. 1893); Cary v. Lovell Mfg. Co., Ltd., 31
F. 344, 345 (W.D. Pa. 1887). Edison Electric Light Co. v. Packard Electric
Co., 61 F. 1002-03 (N.D. Ohio 1893):
The complainants have established the validity of their patent by these
several adjudications ....
To ask this court to go through the labor to
pass. upon a case involving the same questions of law. and fact,, and to
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refuse to upset standing decisions of patent validity,2 3 basing
compel the complainants, in each district where an infringement may
take place, to incur such additional expenditure of money, would be a
great hardship. I accept the decisions of the several circuit courts
named as sufficiently persuasive to authorize me to find the letters
patent valid.

Accord, Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co. of New York,
162 F. 892-93 (2d Cir. 1908) ; Crier v. Innes, 170 F. 324-25 (2d Cir. 1909).
23 Nickerson v. Kutschera 390 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1968); Cold Metal
Process Company v. E. W. Bliss Company, 285 F.2d 231, 236 (6th Cir.
1960) ; Cold Metal Process Company v. Republic Steel Corporation, 233
F.2d 828, 837 (6th Cir. 1956); Sutherland Paper Co. v. Grant Paper Box
Co., 183 F.2d 926, 936 (3d Cir. 1950); Robertson Rock Bit Co. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 176 F.2d 783, 790 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Blanc v. Cayo, 139 F.2d 695
(6th Cir. 1943); Novadel-Agene Corp. v. Tex-O-Kan, 119 F.2d 764 (5th
Cir. 1941); Federal Electric Co., Inc. v. Flexlume Corp., 33 F.2d 412-13
(7th Cir. 1929); Freeman-Sweet Co. v. Luminous Unit Co., 264 F. 107-08
(7th Cir. 1919) ; Weber Electric Co. v. Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co., 256 F.
31, 33 (2d Cir. 1919); Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co.,
230 F. 453-54 (6th Cir. 1916) ; National Electric Signaling Co. v. Telefunken
Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, 221 F. 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1915);
Doelger v. German-American Filter Co., 204 F. 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1913);
Calculagraph Co. v. Automatic Time Stamp Co., 187 F. 276-77 (2d Cir.
1911); Warren Bros. Co. v. City of New York, 187 F. 831, 835 (2d Cir.
1911); Gormley & Jeffrey Tire Co. v. United States Agency, 177 F. 691-92
(2d Cir. 1910); Penfield v. C. & A. Potts & Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th Cir.
1903); Hatch Storage Battery Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 100 F.
975-76 (1st Cir. 1900); Bresnahan v. Tripp Giant Leveller Co., 99 F. 280,
282-83 (1st Cir. 1900); Beach v. Hobbs, 92 F. 146-47 (1st Cir. 1899) ; New
York Filter Mfg. Co. v. Niagara Falls Waterworks Co., 80 F. 924, 929 (2d
Cir. 1897); Electric Mfg. Co. v. Edison Electric Light Co., 61 F. 834, 836
(7th Cir. 1894) ; American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 257 F.
Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. 11. 1966); Bishop and Babcock Mfg. Co. v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 125 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Ohio 1954) ; Hunt v. Armour
& Co., 90 F. Supp. 767, 769 (N.D. 11. 1950); Steele v. Esquire Laundry
& Dry Cleaners, 90 F. Supp. 61, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Koolvent Metal
Awning Corporation v. Graham, 82 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Petersime
Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446, 449 (S.D. Ohio
1942); Swan Carburator Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 34 F. Supp. 766-67 (E.D.
Mich. 1940); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Mach. Co., 35 F. Supp. 879, 882
(N.D. Tex. 1939); Guthard v. Sanitary District, 8 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill.
1934); Lektophone Corporation v. Miller Bros. Co., 37 F.2d 580-81 (D. Del.
1930); Bellows-Claude Neon Co. v. Sun Ray Gas Corp., 39 F.2d 907, 913-14
(N.D. Ohio 1929); Crozier-Straub, Inc. v. Reiter, 34 F.2d 577-78 (E.D. Pa.
1929); Carson Investment Co. v. Calumet & Arizona Mining Co., 29 F.2d
300-01 (D. Ariz. 1928); Minerals Separation North American Corporation
v. Magma Copper Co., 23 F.2d 931, 933-34 (D. Me. 1928) ; Rousso v. First
National Bank, 19 F.2d 247, 249 (E.D. Mich. 1927); Gross v. Norris, 18
F.2d 418, 420 (D. Md. 1927) - Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Precise
Mfg. Corp., 10 F.2d 517 (W.b.N.Y. 1925); McLaren Products Co. v. Cone
Co. of America, 7 F.2d 120, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); Waterbury Buckle Co.
v. G. E. Prentice Mfg. Co., 294 F. 930, 932-33 (D. Conn. 1923); Johnson
v. Lit Bros., Inc., 278 F. 279, 281 (E.D. Pa. 1921); Flat Slabs Patents Co.
v. Wright, Barrett & Stilwell Co., 283 F. 345-46 (D. Minn. 1920); ADT
v. E. Kirstein Sons Co., 259 F. 277-78 (W.D.N.Y. 1918); Todd Protectograph Co. v. New Era Mfg. Co., 236 F. 768-69 (E.D. Pa. 1916); Grinnell
Washing Machine Co. v. Clarinda Lawn Mower Co., 237 F. 98-99 (S.D. Iowa
1916); Johns-Pratt Co. v. Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co., 216 F. 639-41 (E.D.
Pa. 1914); Conley v. Thomas, 204 F. 93-94 (W.D. Pa. 1913); Schmeiser
Mfg. Co. v. Lilly, 189 F. 631-32 (D. Ore. 1911); Parsons Non-Skid Co. v.
E. J. Willis Co., 190 F. 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); American Bank Protection
Co. v. Electric Protection Co., 181 F. 350, 361 (D. Minn. 1910); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Fox Typewriter Co., 181 F. 530, 533 (W.D. Mich. 1909);
Walker Patent Pivoted Bin Co. v. Miller & England, 132 F. 823-24 (E.D.
Pa. 1904); Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. A. Klipstein & Co., 125 F.
543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) ; Duff Mfg. Co v. Norton, 96 F. 986, 988 (D. Mass.
1899); Rose v. Fretz, 98 F. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1899); Office Specialty Mfg.
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decisions

on

comity, 24

either

stare

decisis,

25

public

Co. v. Winternight & Cornyn Mfg. Co., 67 F. 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1895); Green
v. City of Lynn, 55 F. 516, 520 (D. Mass. 1893) ; Zinsser v. Krueger, 45 F.
572, 574-75 (D.N.J. 1891); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Deisler, 46 F. 854-55
(E.D. Pa. 1891); Pratt v. Wright, 65 F. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1890); American
Ballast Log Co. v. Cotter, 11 F. 728-29 (E.D. Pa. 1882) ; Green v. French,
11 F. 591-92 (D.N.J. 1882); Hammerschlag v. Garrett, 9 F. 43-44 (E.D.
Pa. 1881).
24Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1900):
Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency.

It is something more than mere courtesy .

.

. since it has a

substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discouraging
repeated litigation of the same question ....

Comity persuades; but it

does not command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how
it may with propriety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the
primary duty of every court is to dispose of cases according to the law
and the facts; in a word, to decide them right . . . . It is only in cases
where, in . . . [the judge's] own mind, there may be doubt as to the

soundness of his views that comity comes in play and suggests a uniformity of ruling to avoid confusion, until a higher court has settled the
law.... [I)t applies only to questions which have been actually decided,
and which arose under the same facts.
Accord, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124,
133 (2d Cir. 1958); Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278 ( 10th
Cir. 1950); Larkin Automotive Parts Co. v. Bassick Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d
944-45 (7th Cir. 1927); Irving-Pitt Mfg. Co. v. Blackwell-Wielandy Book
& Stationery Co., 238 F. 177 (8th Cir. 1916); National Electric Signaling
Co. v. Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, 221 F. 629,
632 (2d Cir. 1915); Doelger v. German-American Filter Co., 204 F. 274,
276 (2d Cir. 1913); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Sutter, 194 F.
888, 891 (W.D. Pa. 1912); Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Braeckel Concentrator Co., 197 F. 897, 899 (W.D. Mo. 1912) ; American Bell Telephone Co.
v. Wallace Electric Telephone Co., 37 F. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) ; Stuart v.
Thorman, 37 F. 90 (D. Md. 1888); Worswick Mfg. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 30 F. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1887); Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Zylonite Brush
& Comb Co., 27 F. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
25 Some courts limited the doctrine of stare decisis to decisions rendered
within the same circuit: American Photocopy Equipment v. Rovico, Inc.,
257 F. Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1966) :
We are satisfied, initially, that the finding of validity by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals . . . is binding upon this Court in the absence
of persuasive new evidence of invalidity . . . despite the difference in

parties. In addition, where the prior decision of validity and infringement is in a different circuit ... it is to be considered "strongly persuasive" . . . We are of the opinion that defendant herein has failed to
introduce any evidence which substantially contradicts the . . . findings

in the Seventh Circuit, and/or "strongly persuades" this Court that the
patent in issue is invalid.
Gordon Johnson Co. v. Hunt, 102 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (N.D. Ohio 1952):
The patent in suit also was held valid and infringed by the Court of
Appeals for this Circuit .

.

.

. This infringement suit was brought

against a stranger to plaintiff. Nevertheless, the decision by the Court
of Appeals becomes stare decisis and is binding upon this court as to
all issues of law and fact decided therein.
Accord, Blanc v. Cayo 139 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1943); Penfield v. Potts &
Co., 126 F. 475 (6th ir. 1903); Bishop and Babcock Mfg. Co. v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 125 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ohio 1954); Petersime Incubator
Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S.D. Ohio 1942) ; Lektophone
Corp. v. Miller Bros. Co., 37 F.2d 580 (D. Del. 1930); Carson Investment
Co. v. Calumet & Arizona Mining Co., 29 F.2d 300 (D. Ariz. 1928) ; Gross
v. Norris, 18 F.2d 418 (D. Md. 1927); Rousso v. First National Bank, 19
F.2d 247 (E.D. Mich. 1927); Flat Slabs Patents Co. v. Wright, Barrett &
Stilwell Co., 283 F. 345 (D. Minn. 1920); Conley v. Thomas, 204 F. 93
(W.D. Pa. 1913); Walker Patent Pivoted Bin Co. v. Miller & England,
132 F. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1904); Badisehe Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. A. Klipstein
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2
and/or judicial consistency and expedienCy. 7

Through these cases, the following tests were developed
to determine whether the prior decisions of validity should be
followed:
& Co., 125 F. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); Hammerschlag v. Garrett, 9 F. 43 (E.D.
Pa. 1881).
Other courts extended the doctrine of Stare Decisis to include decisions
rendered in co-ordinate courts in different circuits. Cold Metal Process
Company v. E. W. Bliss Company, 285 F.2d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 1960).
[P]rior decisions holding the patent valid, even though from a different
circuit, should be followed unless the Court was convinced of 'a very
palpable error in law or fact' ....
Warren Bros. Co. v. City of New York, 187 F. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1911)
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of comity not only, but the orderly administration of justice, requires that the Circuit Court should
adopt and follow the decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals in other
circuits than their own, rendered upon facts substantially identical. Any
other rule would lead to confusion and injustice. Of course in such circumstances the defendant in patent cases may introduce new evidence of
anticipation and may show that the facts on which infringement is
based are essentially different from those in the adjudicated case. Such
proof must carry conviction with it.
Accord, The Cold Metal Process Company v. Republic Steel Corp., 233 F.2d
828 (6th Cir. 1956); Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co.,
230 F. 453 (6th Cir. 1916); American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico,
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Parsons Non-Skid Co. v. E. J. Willis
Co., 190 F. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Winternight &
Cornyn Mfg. Co., 67 F. 928 (E.D. Pa. 1895); MacBeth v. Gillinder, 54 F.
169 (E.D. Pa. 1889); Green v. French, 11 F. 591 (D.N.J. 1882); American
Ballast Log Co. v. Cotter, 11 F. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1882).
26 Sutherland Paper Co. v. Grant Paper Box Co., 183 F.2d 926, 936 (3d
Cir. 1950) :
[We regard it as of considerable importance that this patent has already been held valid by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ....
The public interest in finality of patent validity determination has not
prevailed over established principles of res judicata. But that interest
is substantial. It, and proper respect for responsible adjudication,
would seem to require the most searching examination of the facts prior
to any assumption or conclusion that the First Circuit is wrong.
Accord, Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 230 F. 453-54
(6th Cir. 1916); Calculagraph Co. v. Automatic Time Stamp Co., 187 F.
276-77 (2d Cir. 1911) ; Penfield v. C. & A. Potts & Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th
Cir. 1903); Bresnahan v. Tripp Giant Leveller Co., 99 F. 280, 282-83 (1st
Cir. 1900); Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Winternight & Cornyn Mfg. Co.,
67 F. 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1895).
27 Calculagraph Co. v. Automatic Time Stamp Co., 187 F. 276-77 (2d
Cir. 1911):
IT]he orderly administration of justice requires that, where a question
has been decided after careful and exhaustive examination by the Court
of Appeals of one circuit, another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction should
not reach a different conclusion unless persuaded that the first decision
is clearly wrong. Especially is this true in patent causes, for otherwise,
under our present system, a party may be punished for an act which on
the other side of a dividing line is perfectly lawful and proper.
Accord, Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 230 F. 453-54
(6th Cir. 1916); Warren Bros. Co. v. City of New York, 187 F. 831, 835
(2d Cir. 1911); Edison Electric Light Co. v. Packard Electric Co., 61 F.
1002, 1003 (N.D. Ohio 1893) ; Zinsser v. Krueger,'45 F. 572, 574-75 (D.N.J.
1891); Hammerschlag v. Garrett, 9 F. 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1881).
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If there were palpable error,2 manifest error,29 or clear
mistake 30 in law or in fact in the prior decision, the issue of
patent validity would be reconsidered;
if there were not an identity of issues 3' and if there were not
the substantially same state of facts, 32 the issues of patent
validity would be reconsidered; and
if there were substantially newly discovered evidence,2 2 not
previously considered in the prior decision, the issue of
patent validity would be reconsidered.
28 Cold Metal Process Co. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 285 F.2d 231, 236 (6th
Cir. 1960):
[P]rior decisions holding the patent valid, even though from a different
circuit should be followed unless the Court was convinced of 'a very
palpable error in law or fact.'
Accord, Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 828, 837
(6th Cir. 1956); Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 230
F. 453-54 (6th Cir. 1916) ; Penfield v. C. A. Potts & Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th
Cir. 1903).
29 Beach v. Hobbs, 92 F. 146-47 (1st Cir. 1899)
Although the defendants in this case are not the same, or in privity with
the defendants in the other cases, we think, as a general rule, and
especially in patent cases, we should follow the decision of the circuit
court of appeals of another circuit upon final hearing with respect to the
issues determined, if based upon substantially the same state of facts,
unless it should clearly appear that there was manifest error.
See Zinsser v. Krueger, 45 F. 572, 574-75 (D.N.J. 1891).
30 Calculagraph Co. v. Automatic Time Stamp Co., 187 F. 276-77 (2d
Cir. 1911); Searls v. Worden, 11 F. 501-02 (D. Mich. 1882); Hammerschlag
v. Garrett, 9 F. 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1881).
31 Beach v. Hobbs, 92 F. 146-47 (1st Cir. 1899) ; Office Specialty Mfg. Co.
v. Winternight & Cornyn Mfg. Co., 67 F. 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1895); Searls v.
Worden, 11 F. 501-02 (D. Mich. 1882); American Ballast Log Co. v. Cotter,
11 F. 728-29 (E.D. Pa. 1882).
32Warren Bros. Co. v. City of New York, 187 F. 831, 835 (2d Cir.
1911); Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Winternight & Cornyn Mfg. Co., 67
F. 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1895); American Ballast Log Co. v. Cotter, 11 F.
728-29 (E.D. Pa. 1882); Green v. French, 11 F. 591-92 (D.N.J. 1882).
3 Johns-Pratt Co. v. Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co., 216 F. 639-41 (E.D.
Pa. 1914):
As the present case follows previous judicial inquiries into the validity
of this patent, the inquiry here is directed chiefly to whether the present
attack involves anything which, if introduced as part of the defense in
the previous cases, would have compelled a different judgment.

There must come a time, however, if our patent laws are to have any
value or give any protection to inventors, when the proprietary right
favored by our Constitution and given by acts of Congress becomes so
buttressed by judicial rulings upholding it as to be protected from
further attack. This patent is entitled to this immunity.
This surely restricts . . . the present discussion to an inquiry into the
sole question of whether the present record discloses any evidence which
is not to be found in the record of the cases in which the plaintiff's right
was upheld. This evidence, to affect the decree, must be new, not only
in the sense that it was not before introduced, but in the sense that the
evidence is different.
A difference of ruling must be effected, not by a change in the conclusions
or judgments which dictated the former rulings, but in the evidence commanding different findings of facts from those on which the former
conclusions of law were based. This evidence must differ also in kind,
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Thus, the courts upheld the validity of the patent based upon
a prior determination of validity, where the same issues and substantially the same facts were involved, and without the appearance of new evidence or apparent manifest error of law or fact.
The doctrine of comity as applied to patent validity strongly
parallels the Blonder-Tongue decision, which indicates a like
result in upholding prior determinations of patent invalidity on
the basis of public policy considerations, court consistency and
34
expediency.
BLONDER-TONGUE APPLIED

Since the Blonder-Tongue decision, the courts have had
ample opportunity to consider estoppel pleas.
The facts in Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co. 5
were similar to those in Blonder-Tongue. At the time the decision was rendered by the district court, the rule of Triplett
was still in full force and effect. As a result, the district court,
although cognizant of a decision in another district declaring the
same patent invalid, relitigated the issue of validity and found
the patent valid and infringed. Following this second decision,
the Supreme Court handed down Blonder-Tongue, reversing
Triplett to the extent that it foreclosed a plea of estoppel. As
a result of the Blonder-Tongue decision, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has remanded the Monsanto case to the district court
for consideration of an estoppel plea.
Blumcraft of Pittsburghv. Kawneer Co., Inc.3 6 supported the
proposition established in Blonder-Tongue that a patentee is
entitled to introduce evidence and argument showing why an
estoppel should not be imposed in a second case. The court, in
a later decision,3 7 determined that an estoppel should not apply
since there were two prior determinations, the one conflicting
with the other.
as well as the means by which it is introduced....
...The best test of whether the evidence introduced in the present
case is new in this sense is-.... Do they reargue the old questions upon
the old evidence, or place their reliance upon the new?
Accord, Warren Bros. Co. v. City of New York, 187 F. 831, 835 (2d Cir.
1911) ; American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192,
194 (N.D. Il1. 1966) ; Lektophone Corp. v. Miller Bros. Co., 37 F.2d. 580-81
(D. Del. 1930) ; Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. A. Klipstein & Co., 125
F. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) ; Searls v. Worden, 11 F. 501-02(D. Mich. 1882).
34 Blonder-Tongue, supra note 1, at 334-49.
35 443 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1971).
36 171 U.S.P.Q. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
37 172 U.S.P.Q. 43 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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In Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. National Tank Co., 38 the
issues of patent validity and infringement had been decided in
the district court on defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The district court had held the patent invalid and not infringed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
basis that there were genuine issues of fact which should have
been tried. Reference was made to the Blonder-Tongue decision
and the importance, in light of that decision, of fairly and adequately trying the issue of patent validity the first time. 9
In Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 40 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court judgment
on defendant's motion, which had contended that plaintiffspatentees, having failed to join the exclusive licensee, lacked
capacity to sue. For the first time on appeal, the defendantappellee raised the question of estoppel resulting from a prior
determination in the same district court on the ground that Blonder-Tongue had abrogated the mutuality requirement. The
court held that:
[T]he Blonder-Tongue decision was not intended to constitute a
wholesale rejection of the mutuality requirement. The holding
of Blonder-Tongue was that "Triplett should be overruled to the
extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of
infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid." That
holding does not reach this case where there has never been a
determination of the validity of the . . . patents; and we do not
believe that this is a proper case for the extension of BlonderTongue's abrogation of the mutuality requirement to situations
where there
has not been a prior determination of patent in41
validity.
In Boutell v. Volk 42 the court refused to extend the estoppel
plea to prior determinations of patent validity.
And now, in Woodstream Corp. v. Herter's, Inc.,4 3 the
Eighth Circuit, as a result of Blonder-Tongue, has placed a new
emphasis on the importance of carefully trying the issue of
patent validity and in applying thereto the proper legal standards. In this instance, the English Circuit upheld the validity
of the patent.
Since Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court has denied the
petitions for writs of certiorari, requesting clarification or ex44
tension of Blonder-Tongue.
38445 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1971).

39 Id. at 926 n.2.
40 444 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1971).
41 Id. at 217.
42449 F.2d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 1971).

43446 F.2d 1143, 1149 (8th Cir. 1971).
44 Stukenborg v. Teledyne, Inc., 404 U.S. 852 (1971). Petitioner sought
to extend Blonder-Tongue to include prior adjudications of patent validity.
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CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the courts should now recognize a greater
obligation in patent cases to carefully construe both the technical
and legal issues before them And to uniformly apply the
applicable substantive rules of law. Although the courts will,
of necessity, consider evidence attacking a prior decision of
patent invalidity, it seems highly unlikely that a trial court in
one district would find error in a final determination on the
appellate level in another district. The indication, one might
reasonably gather, is that Blonder-Tongue will be construed
Further, that a prior
restrictively against patent owners.
would
be presumptively valid
invalidity
of
patent
determination
and binding in absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing error or injustice.
Moreover, in spite of the existing doctrine of comity, it
seems that the estoppel plea will not be extended to include
prior determinations of patent validity nor any other situation
until acted upon by the Supreme Court. From the language of
the decision itself and the denials of certiorari, the Supreme
Court has indicated that it will not at this time extend an estoppel
plea to any other situation. It may be that in due time, and
upon a showing that the estoppel plea is in fact effective in reducing burdensome court dockets without rendering injustice,
the Supreme Court will see fit to extend the doctrine to other
applicable situations.
In view of the existing trend of the Supreme Court to limit
the patent monopoly,25 it is unlikely that an estoppel plea will
ever extend to prior determinations of patent validity. To this
extent, Blonder-Tongue may well be another means of further
limiting the patent monopoly. A patent's validity may be
challenged throughout its life, but once a patent is declared
invalid, it dies unless resurrected by exceptions provided in the
decision. This death knell for patents sounds of in rem invaIn view of
Deere & Company v. Hessten Corp., 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
Blonder-Tongue petitioner sought the adoption by the Supreme Court of:
a more liberal attitude toward petitions for certiorari in cases where a
Court of Appeals had handed down a decision which fails to heed the
controlling decisions of . . . [the Supreme Court] or is in conflict with
other decisions handed down by different panels of the same Court of

Appeals.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc., 404 U.S. 976
(1971).

Petitioner sought to extend Blonder-Tongue to permit an estoppel

plea in the district
Patent Interferences
45 For a further
Blonder-Tongue and
SocY 581 (1971).

court on a prior determination before the Board of
on the issue of "priority."
discussion of the Blonder-Tongue decision see D. Kahn,
the Shape of Future Patent Litigation, 53 J. PAT. OFF.

1972]
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lidity, but it is not so encompassing as long at there is a possibility to avoid or circumvent the estoppel plea.
Since the initial adjudication may be the final, careful and
detailed consideration should be given in advance; both as to the
advisability of litigating a patent and where such litigation
should take place.
Canella E. Henrichs

